United Nations A/68/703–S/2014/18

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 9 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a complaint against Israel, which is waging an electronic war on Lebanon and its information and communication networks (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-20520 (E) 150114 160114

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Annex to the identical letters dated 9 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Complaint to the Security Council concerning the Israeli electronic war on Lebanon and its information and communication networks

The relevant Lebanese military and technical bodies, namely the Ministry of Communication, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and the Lebanese Army, have noticed a marked increase in the number of positions, towers, masts and other devices for monitoring, espionage and surveillance that have been installed along the Lebanese border with occupied Palestine and directed towards Lebanese territory. In view of those developments, specialized units within the competent Lebanese agencies have been monitoring and analysing the activities of the devices. The team found that the Israeli enemy is using them to break into the various Lebanese information and communication networks, such as the mobile telephone, landline and radio networks and the Internet, in addition to spying on information and communication networks used by the Lebanese Army and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The towers and masts enable the Israeli enemy to access communication networks and e-mail accounts belonging to Lebanese public and private institutions, financial and trading companies, banks and foreign embassies in Lebanon, in addition to monitoring the traffic and content of telephone calls, text messages, e-mails and social networking sites. Those acts of aggression amount to an electronic war waged by the Israeli enemy against the Lebanese Republic. They are a growing and urgent threat to the sovereignty and national and economic security of Lebanon.

This recurrent and intensified Israeli aggression constitutes:

- A standing violation of the sovereignty of the Lebanese Republic, international law and norms, and the Charter of the United Nations;
- A constant and flagrant infringement of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and a threat to international peace and security;
- A violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 68/167 on the right to privacy in the digital age, adopted by consensus on 18 December 2013;
- A contravention of articles 1, 6, 38, 42 and 45 of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, and of resolutions 48 (Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973), 74 (Nairobi, 1982), 64 (Nice, 1989), 159 (Antalya, 2006) and 173 (Guadalajara, 2010) of the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union.

Lebanon's sovereignty has continued to be the target of repeated Israeli attacks. The country's air, land and sea borders have been violated on a daily basis. Advanced espionage, wiretapping and surveillance equipment has been discovered within Lebanese territory. Spy rings have been recruited at sensitive points in the country's information and communication technology sector. Lebanon has documented those acts of aggression in numerous complaints to the United Nations

Secretariat and the Security Council and in periodic reports of the Secretary-General.

As the target of Israel's electronic onslaught, Lebanon calls on the Security Council to assume its responsibility to preserve international peace and security in a highly sensitive region. The Council should bring pressure to bear on Israel to end its intensified electronic war, which targets the sovereignty and economy of Lebanon and the rights and freedoms of its citizens. It should prevail on Israel to remove all masts and espionage and surveillance devices directed towards Lebanese territory, and bring an immediate end to all unlawful acts of piracy, infiltration and sabotage of Lebanese information and communication networks.

United Nations A/68/704–S/2014/19

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 9 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 27 December 2013, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

14-20548 (E) 140114

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 13 December 2013, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/68/665-S/2013/738), which yet again contains false allegations similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, the Greek Cypriot representative should be reminded that none of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus describe the legitimate and justified Turkish intervention of 1974, undertaken in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as "invasion". Such distortions are purely a Greek Cypriot forgery aimed at blurring the issue and confusing the innocent with the guilty. On this point, it is imperative to recall the dramatic statement made by Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader at the time, before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, in which he openly accused Greece, not Turkey, of invading and occupying Cyprus. His remarks, which came only four days after the Greek coup of 15 July 1974, are well recorded in the annals of the United Nations and hardly require further elaboration.

As regards the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to underline that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and permission of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. Similarly, the allegation raised in the above-mentioned letter in relation to Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another effort aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island.

As noted in our previous letters, such assertions are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious assertion by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the repeated false claims regarding the Ercan airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in Northern Cyprus have been providing successful and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island in line with its isolation policy imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and

consent of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety reflects all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe, regular and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport as well as using the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus airspace. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in constant and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In fact, each year more than 19,000 flights take place to and from the Ercan airport, serving over 2 million passengers, including Greek Cypriots, and approximately 600 aircraft per day pass through the Ercan advisory airspace. In the year 2012 alone, 2,777,000 passengers used the Ercan airport. It is predicted that this number will be around 3 million in 2013. In sum, the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944 and is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the Greek Cypriot daily *Fileleftheros* reported on 23 September 2012 that nearly 100 air traffic controllers serving in South Cyprus had sent an informing document to all Greek Cypriot political parties concerning their problems and shortcomings in providing satisfactory air traffic control, pointing out, inter alia, the fact that a most-needed new meteorology radar had not been purchased and 55 controller vacancies could not be filled. Given its evident difficulties in providing effective air navigation services and the existence of an agreed United Nations platform for cooperation, namely the technical committees, which can also be established on an ad hoc basis, it is difficult to understand the Greek Cypriot refusal to cooperate on the very important technical issue of aviation safety. The refusal of the Nicosia area control centre to cooperate with the Ercan area control centre inevitably has a negative effect on efforts to increase flight safety in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions. We believe that establishing a cooperative relationship on the issue of aviation safety shall be a most-needed positive development on the island and the region, serving as a confidence-building measure, especially at a time when the full-fledged negotiations have come to a standstill owing to the intransigent Greek Cypriot stance.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false accounts, to confer legitimacy upon the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile, since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island is for the Greek Cypriot side to stop misappropriating for itself the rights and responsibilities that it does not legally have, and to cease its hostile and derogatory acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the north of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations

parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call on the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue its well-known propaganda and delaying tactics and pave the way for the earliest resumption of the full-fledged negotiations between the two leaders under your good offices mission for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to continuing to maintain our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/68/705–S/2014/22

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
14 January 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 34 and 38

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 13 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for December 2013 (see annex). As seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia. As a result, one serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed and another one was wounded.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under the agenda items 34 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-20796 (E) 200114

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Annex to the letter dated 13 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for December 2013*

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1	1 December	0025-0030	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
2		0120-0205	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
3		0220-0230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
4		1530-1545	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
5		1700-1710	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Mazamly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
6		1750-1810	Garagashly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
7		2040-2110	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
8		2120-2130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
9	2 December	0400-0415	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
10		0505-0510	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
11		0507-0512	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
12		0510-0515	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
13		1800-1810	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
14		1750-1810	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
15	3 December	0510-0515	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
16		0555-0600	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
17		0730	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	–	A serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
18	5 December	0050-0100	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
19		0200-0215	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
20		1920-1935	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
21		1930-1935	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
22		2100-2115	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
23	6 December	0310-0320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
24		0425-0435	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
25		0525-0530	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
26		1640-1650	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
27		2005-2015	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
28		2300-2305	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
29	7 December	0400-0405	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
30		2030-2040	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
31	8 December	0455-0500	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
32		0510-0520	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
33		1800-1810	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
34		2035-2040	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
35	9 December	0225-0305	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
36		0310-0315	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
37		0820-0825	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
38	10 December	0330-0340	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
39		1210-1220	Jil village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Alagoller village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
40		1425-1430	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
41		1830-1835	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
42		1845-1850	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
43	11 December	2230-2245	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
44		2330-2340	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
45		2350-0005	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
46		2355-0005	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
47	12 December	0530-0540	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
48		0930-1010	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
49		1600-1620	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
50	13 December	0040-0055	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
51		0520-0530	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
52		0555-0600	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
53		2225-2235	Azatamut village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Jafarli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
54	14 December	0250-0300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
55		0325-0330	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
56		1720-1745	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
57	15 December	1320-1345	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
58	16 December	2015-2035	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
59		2035-2200	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
60	17 December	0130-0140	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
61		0510-0515	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
62		1840-1850	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
63		2125-2135	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
64		2130-2140	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
65	18 December	0115-0120	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
66	19 December	0130-0135	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
67		0905-0910	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
68		0915-0925	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
69		1635-1640	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
70		1720-1730	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
71		1750-1810	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
72		1950-2015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
73		2130-2145	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
74		2340-2345	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
75	20 December	0005-0015	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
76		0410-0415	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
77		1850-1900	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
78	21 December	0110-0115	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
79		0120-0125	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
80		1350-1400	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
81		1450-1510	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
82		1830-1845	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
83		1835-1855	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
84		2145-2200	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
85		2230-2245	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
86	22 December	0125-0130	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
87		0155-0200	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
88		0230-0235	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
89		0230-0235	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
90		0530-0535	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
91		0940-1010	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
92		1650-1655	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
93		1800-1815	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
94		1850-1855	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
95		1905-1930	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
96		2100-2120	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
97	23 December	0245-0300	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
98		0245-0305	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
99		1020-1035	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
100		1155-1205	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
101		1210-1225	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
102		1905-1935	Nemirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
103	24 December	0000-0005	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
104		0450-0500	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
105		0515-0520	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
106		0625-0635	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
107		1735-1755	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
108		2155-2200	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
109		2155-2200	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
110	25 December	0115-0130	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
111		0730-0740	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
112		1305-1315	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
113		1720-1735	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
114		2120-2125	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK assault rifle	–
115		2115-2135	Seysulan village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan	AK assault rifle	–
116	26 December	0655-0700	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
117		0700-0715	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
118		1030-1035	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
119		1040-1055	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
120		1200-1240	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
121		1410-1415	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
122		1450-1500	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
123		1615-1620	Mehdili village (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
124		1700-1710	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
125		2230-2240	Barekamavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
126		2235-2240	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
127		2350-0015	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
128	27 December	0005-0020	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
129		0115-0125	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
130		0240-0255	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
131		0400-0420	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
132		1250	Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	–	A serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed
133		1340-1345	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
134		1600-1610	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
135		2150-2205	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
136		2205-2230	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
137	28 December	0135-0145	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
138	29 December	0430-0435	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
139		2035-2040	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
140		2040-2045	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
141	31 December	1220-1250	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle and PK machine gun	–
142		1245-1255	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
143		2130-2145	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle and PK machine gun	–

Abbreviations: AK/AKM — Kalashnikov assault rifles; PK — Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD — sniper rifle; DShK — heavy machine gun.

United Nations A/68/706–S/2014/24

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 January 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 33 and 38

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Prevention of armed conflict

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 13 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of December 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-20810 (E) 200114

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 13 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-31 December 2013

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations — 778

   Total number of shots – 3,925

   AK – 2920, PK – 544, SVD – 234, RPK – 221, Black arrow – 2, Istigall – 4

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations — 105

   Total number of shots – 475

   AK – 219, PK – 45, SVD – 119, DSHK – 29, RPK – 45, Black arrow – 17, Utyos – 1

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1	1 December	Chinari	0110	AK	2	–
2			2120	SVD	3	
3		Berqaber	1430		2	
4	2 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	1240	SVD	4	–
5			1320		1	
6		Movses	1300	AK	2	
7		Aygepar	1330	DSHK	15	
8	3 December	Paravaqar	2140	AK	6	–
9	4 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	2045	AK	2	–
10		Berqaber	1800	SVD	5	
11	5 December	Chinari	2240	SVD	3	–
12	6 December	Kayanavan	2140	AK	6	–
13	7 December	Aygedzor	1520	SVD	2	–
14			2305	AK	22	
15		Voskepar	2030		1	
16	8 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	2235	AK	4	–
17	9 December	Aygepar	0105	PK	2	–
18			0150	AK	2	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; DSHK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istigall, 14.5 mm machine gun; Utyos, 12.7 mm machine gun.

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
19		N. Karmiraghbyur	0120	AK	1	
20	10 December	Voskepar	0920	AK	2	–
21		Chinari	1345		3	
22		Barcruni	1430	SVD	15	
23	11 December	Movses	0500	PK	2	–
24	13 December	Laligyugh	1635	Black arrow	9	–
25		N. Karmiraghbyur	2040	AK	6	
26	14 December	Aygedzor	1735	AK	5	–
27		Kayanavan	2100	DSHK	8	
28	15 December	Movses	1700	DSHK	6	At 1700: In the combat position soldier Hrant Poghosyan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side
29	16 December	Movses	0040	AK	4	–
30			1030		2	
31			1515		2	
32			1945		4	
33			2000		1	
34		Chinari	1020	AK	4	
35			1930		5	
36				SVD	1	
37			2000	AK	2	
38		Aygepar	1045	AK	1	
39		Berqaber	2250	PK	5	
40	17 December	Movses	1515	AK	1	–
41	18 December	Mehrab	1530	SVD	2	–
42		Chinari	1840		6	
43	19 December	Movses	0425	AK	3	–
44			1650	SVD	1	
45				Utyos	1	
46		Aygedzor	0630	AK	1	
47		N. Karmiraghbyur	1410	AK	2	
48			1650	SVD	2	
49		Aygepar	2215	AK	2	
50	20 December	Chinari	1920	SVD	4	–
51			1955	SVD	1	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
52			2000	SVD	3	
53	21 December	Chinari	0310	SVD	6	–
54		Voskepar	1215	Black arrow	6	
55		N. Karmiraghbyur	1320	AK	2	
56		Movses	1520	SVD	3	
57			1520	SVD	2	
58		Mehrab	1930	Black arrow	2	
59	22 December	Movses	0400	AK	1	At 1515: In the combat position soldier Hovhanes Davtyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side
60		Vazashen	1340	PK	4	
61		N. Karmiraghbyur	1345	SVD	2	
62			1355		2	
63			1535		3	
64		Chinari	1430	SVD	4	
65			2040	AK	1	
66			2150		2	
67		Paravaqar	2100	SVD	3	
68			2135		2	
69		Dovegh	2120		3	
70	23 December	Aygedzor	0020	PK	5	At 1015: In the combat position soldier Erik Karapetyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side
71		Berdavan	0030	SVD	8	
72			1435	AK	15	
73				PK	15	
74		N. Karmiraghbyur	1735	PK	2	
75		Barekamavan	1610	AK	2	
76	24 December	Chinari	2015	AK	2	–
77				SVD	2	
78		Movses	1300	AK	3	
79		Aygepar	2025	AK	2	
80	25 December	Vazashen	1330	PK	8	–
81			1730	AK	2	
82		Eraskh	2110	AK	2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
83		N. Karmiraghbyur	2140	AK	7	
84		Movses	2230	PK	2	
85	26 December	Barcruni	1825	RPK	45	–
86		N. Karmiraghbyur	1940	AK	2	
87		Aygepar	1940	AK	1	
88			2200		1	
89	27 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	0345	AK	1	–
90			0415		1	
91		Tigranashen	1705		3	
92	28 December	Aygepar	0140	AK	2	–
93			1515		1	
94		Vazashen	1450	SVD	10	
95		Paravaqar	2345	AK	1	
96	29 December	Paravaqar	1030	AK	3	–
97		Movses	1045	SVD	2	
98		Mehrab	2130		5	
99	30 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	0205	AK	1	–
100		Paravaqar	1945		20	
101		Voskepar	2050		5	
102	31 December	Chinari	1300	AK	25	–
103		Vazashen	1410	SVD	7	
104		Voskepar	1830	AK	10	
105		Movses	1945		3	

United Nations A/68/707–S/2014/25

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 January 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 14 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Following our letter dated 9 January 2014, regarding the complaint submitted by the Government of Lebanon against Israel for launching electronic warfare on Lebanon and its communication and data networks, kindly find attached materials related to the above-mentioned complaint (see annexes).

These annexes are as follows:

I. Examples of Israeli signals tracked in the Beirut vicinity.

II. Examples of Israeli signals tracked at Ras Al-Naqoura Israeli spying site.

III. Examples of Israeli signals tracked at Jal Alam Israeli spying site.

IV. Photos of Jal Alam Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon.

V. Photos of Al Abad Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon.

VI. Photos of Ras Al-Naqoura Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon.

VII. Example of Lebanese MW Backbone link signals pirated and spied on by the Israelis.

VIII. Maps showing the location of Israeli spying sites along the Lebanese border.

IX. Resolution 173 adopted by the International Telecommunication Union in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 2010.

I would kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-20804 (E) 170114

Please recycle

Annexes to the identical letters dated 14 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Annex I

Examples of Israeli signals tracked in the Beirut vicinity




Spectrum Analyzer Data
BEITELD-S2-G2A1_#2 (11/7/2013 5:02:26 PM)
Spectrum Analyzer
-50.0
-60.0
-70.0
-80.0
-90.0
-100.0
-110.0
-120.0
-130.0
-140.0
-150.0
dBm
846.00
852.00
858.00
864.00
870.00
876.00
882.00
888.00
894.00
Center Freq: 870.000 000 MHz
Span: 60.000 000 MHz

Annex II

Examples of Israeli signals tracked at Ras Al-Naqoura Israeli spying site



Israeli Tracked at "Ras Al-Naqoura" Israeli Spying/Piracy Antennas Directed Towards Lebanon

Band	Spectrum	Targeted Entities / Victims
UHF	890 MHz – 862 MHz	TV Broadcasting
GSM 1800	890 MHz – 915 MHz	Mobile Cellular Voice and Data Communication
GSM 1900	925 MHz – 960 MHz	Mobile Cellular Voice and Data Communications

Signals Tracked at "Ras Al-Naqoura" Israeli
Jamming/Piracy Antennas Directed Towards Lebanon
HF/ VHF Tactical
FM
Aeronautical
Band
Spectrum
Targeted Entities/Victims
Interference and Mass Communications
Civil Aviation

Example of Signals (Data, Voice, etc..)
Exchanging in Both Directions
Lebanon Site
Israeli Spyline &
Pitsou Site
Lebanon Site
Israeli Spyline &
Pitsou Site

Annex III

Examples of Israeli signals tracked at Jal Alam Israeli spying site




Spectrum Analyzer Data
jal-alalam2-2100m-2150m-toc (10/3/2013 2:30:27 PM)
Spectrum Analyzer
-40.0
-50.0
-60.0
-70.0
-80.0
-90.0
-100.0
-110.0
-120.0
-130.0
-140.0
dBm
2100.000000
2125.000000
2150.000000
Center Freq: 2.125 000 000 GHz
Span: 50.000 000 MHz


Spectrum Analyzer Data
jal-alalam2-2100m-2175m-toc (10/3/2013 2:32:20 PM)
Spectrum Analyzer
-40.0
-50.0
-60.0
-70.0
-80.0
-90.0
-100.0
-110.0
-120.0
-130.0
-140.0
dBm
2100.000000
2137.500000
2175.00000
Center Freq: 2.137 500 000 GHz
Span: 75.000 000 MHz

S:2014.25

Annex IV

Photos of Jal Alam Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon































Annex V

Photos of Al Abad Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon











Annex VI

Photos of Ras Al-Naqoura Israeli spying sites towards Lebanon



Annex VII

Example of Lebanese MW Backbone link signals pirated and spied on by the Israelis



Annex VIII

Maps showing the location of Israeli spying sites along the Lebanese border





Ramat Naftali
Sde Nehemia



Annex IX

Resolution 173 adopted by the International Telecommunication Union in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 2010

Resolution 173 (Guadalajara, 2010)

Piracy and attacks against fixed and cellular telephone networks in Lebanon

The Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (Guadalajara, 2010),

recalling

a) the noble principles, purposes and objectives enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

b) the efforts of the United Nations to promote sustainable development and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;

c) the purposes of the Union as enshrined in Article 1 of the ITU Constitution;

d) § 16 of the Declaration of Principles adopted by the World Summit on the Information Society;

e) previous resolutions of plenipotentiary conferences, namely:

- Resolution 48 (Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, on the destruction of submarine cables in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- Resolution 74 (Nairobi, 1982) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, regarding Israel and assistance to Lebanon;
- Resolution 64 (Nice, 1989) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, on the condemnation of the practices of Israel in the Arab territories occupied by it;
- Resolution 159 (Antalya, 2006) of the Plenipotentiary Conference, relating to the support to Lebanon for rebuilding its telecommunication network, and given that Lebanon has not received, to date, any amounts of the monetary damages estimated by ITU experts at USD 547 million at that time,

recognizing

a) that a reliable telecommunication network is indispensable for promoting the socio-economic development of countries, in particular those having suffered from Israel's actions;

b) that Lebanon's telecommunication facilities have been and are still being subjected to piracy, interference and interruption, and sedition by Israel against Lebanon's fixed and cellular telephone networks;

c) that the damage caused to Lebanon's telecommunications should be a matter of concern for the entire international community, particularly ITU, as the United Nations specialized agency for telecommunications;

d) the full right of Lebanon to compensation for the damages caused to its telecommunication network,

recalling further

that every Member State of ITU should respect the fundamental principles set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution and in Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the Constitution.

resolves

to condemn all attacks and violations by any ITU Member State against telecommunication networks in any other Member States, which harm the latter's national security, *inter alia*, those perpetrated by Israel toward Lebanon,

instructs the Secretary-General and the Directors of the Bureaux

to monitor cease of the above-mentioned violations or harmful transmissions across the border and report to the Council in this respect.

United Nations A/68/708

General Assembly

Distr.: General
15 January 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 22 (b)
Groups of countries in special situations: comprehensive 10-year Review Conference on the Implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action

Proposed organizational aspects of the 10-year Review Conference on the Implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action (second United Nations conference on landlocked developing countries)

Note by the Secretary-General

Summary

The present note is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/225, by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, no later than 15 January 2014, a note on the organizational aspects of the 10-year Review Conference on the Implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action.

14-20858 (E) 230114

Please recycle

I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/214, decided to hold a comprehensive 10-year review conference on the implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries within a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries[1] in 2014. In its resolution 67/222, the Assembly decided that the conference would be convened for a duration of three days and specified the mandate of the conference. Moreover, it decided that the sessions of the intergovernmental preparatory committee would be held in New York in January and April 2014, each for a duration of two working days.

2. In paragraph 29 of its resolution 68/225, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a note on the organizational aspects of the conference, including the venue and the specific dates for the conference and the two sessions of the intergovernmental preparatory committee, to be held for a duration of three days in 2014, in the most cost-effective manner and within the budget allocated, in line with General Assembly resolution 67/222, to be submitted to the Assembly not later than 15 January 2014 for its further consideration.

3. The organizational arrangements proposed below have been formulated on the basis of consultations with the potential host country and relevant departments of the Secretariat.

II. Organizational aspects

A. Dates and venue of the conference

4. On 9 January 2014, the Secretary-General received an offer from the Government of Austria to host the second United Nations conference on landlocked developing countries in Vienna. It is proposed that the conference be held from 3 to 5 November 2014. Pursuant to the provisions of resolution 40/243, subject to the approval of the offer by the General Assembly, the potential host country would defray the actual additional costs directly or indirectly involved. To this end, the Secretary-General is consulting with the Government of Austria as to the nature and possible extent of such costs.

B. Dates and venue of the intergovernmental preparatory committee sessions

5. Pursuant to paragraph 28 of resolution 68/225, wherein the General Assembly decided to reschedule the first and second sessions of the preparatory committee to later dates, it is proposed that the open-ended intergovernmental preparatory committee for the conference hold two sessions, on 12 and 13 June and 11 and 12 September 2014, both at United Nations Headquarters in New York. In order to

[1] *Report of the International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and Donor Countries and International Financial and Development Institutions on Transit Transport Cooperation, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 28 and 29 August 2003* (A/CONF.202/3), annex I.

conduct the sessions of the intergovernmental preparatory committee and informal consultations, as appropriate, a bureau should be established with equitable geographical representation.

C. Organization of work

6. *Intergovernmental track*. In line with the modalities envisaged at the time of the adoption of resolution 67/222, the intergovernmental process of the conference will consist of the committee of the whole and plenary meetings. The inaugural high-level plenary meeting will be held in the morning of the first day. The closing plenary meeting will take place in the afternoon of the final day of the conference.

7. *Private sector track*. A high-level private sector forum will be organized either during or immediately before the conference. The outcome of the forum will be reported to the conference, as appropriate.

8. *Interactive thematic round tables and side events*. Interactive thematic round tables will be organized to facilitate exchange of views and build common understanding on the special needs of landlocked developing countries and their development priorities. A limited number of side events will be held to serve as platforms for the announcement of specific deliverables and initiatives. The themes of these events will be determined through inter-agency consultations and consultations with relevant Member States and international organizations. The resource requirements of these activities will be met from voluntary contributions.

III. Participants

9. The conference and its preparatory committee shall be open to all States Members of the United Nations as well as intergovernmental organizations, United Nations system organizations and international and regional financial and development organizations, in line with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

10. Effective participation of civil society and the private sector in the conference and its preparatory committee sessions should be ensured. The arrangements at the 2003 Almaty conference could be used as a precedent.

11. The side events and interactive thematic discussions should be open to all, including all States Members of the United Nations as well as intergovernmental organizations, United Nations system organizations, international and regional financial and development organizations, civil society and the private sector.

United Nations A/68/709

General Assembly

Distr.: General
17 January 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 161
Financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides details on the donation and final disposition of the assets of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The Mission's assets, with a total inventory value of $293,013,900, were disposed of as at 31 July 2013.

Summary of the disposition of the assets of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan as at 31 July 2013

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Inventory value*	*Percentage*
Group I: transferred to other missions or the United Nations Logistics Base for temporary storage	242 978.3	82.9
Group II: disposed of in the mission area		
Sold	2 272.4	0.8
Donation to the Government of the Sudan	6 276.2	2.1
Donation to the Joint Integrated Units	47.4	0.0[a]
Group III: written off/lost	41 439.5	14.1
Total	**293 013.9**	**100.0**

[a] Rounded.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly, as set out in paragraph 17 of the present report, are to approve the donation of UNMIS assets to the Government of the Sudan and the Joint Integrated Units and to take note of the present report on the final disposition of the assets of UNMIS.

13-63896 (E) 100214

Please recycle

I. Introduction

1. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1590 (2005). In its resolution 1978 (2011), the Council extended the mandate of the Mission until 9 July 2011. In its subsequent resolution 1997 (2011), the Council decided to withdraw UNMIS effective 11 July 2011 and called for the complete withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian UNMIS personnel, other than those required for the Mission's liquidation, by 31 August 2011.

2. In accordance with regulation 5.14 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, the Mission's asset disposal plan provided for the progressive transfer of assets, where feasible and economical, to other peacekeeping operations, to the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for temporary storage or to other United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions, as well as for their disposition through sale to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes or for commercial disposal, as circumstances permitted. Information on the actual disposition of all assets of the Mission, including those identified for donation to the Government of the Sudan and the Joint Integrated Units, is provided in section IV of the present report.

3. Financial regulation 5.14 (e) stipulates that any assets which have been installed in a country and which, if dismantled, would set back the rehabilitation of that country shall be provided to the duly recognized Government of that country in return for compensation in a form to be agreed upon by the Organization and the Government. This refers in particular to airfield installations and equipment, buildings, bridges and mine-clearing equipment. Where such assets cannot be disposed of in this manner or otherwise, they will be contributed free of charge to the Government of the country concerned. Such contributions require the prior approval of the General Assembly.

4. The selection of assets proposed for donation was guided by the provisions of regulation 5.14 and is based on a determination that the assets are not required and are not suitable for transfer to other missions or for temporary storage at the Logistics Base. Furthermore, the cost of dismantling, refurbishing, packing and shipping the assets would render their transfer largely uneconomical.

5. The inventory value of the assets of the Mission as at 31 July 2013 amounted to some $293.0 million, 2.2 per cent of which related to the proposed donations to the Government of the Sudan and the Joint Integrated Units.

6. The present report provides details on the donation and the final disposition of the assets of UNMIS as at 31 July 2013.

II. Donation of assets to the Government of the Sudan

7. In the context of its administrative liquidation, UNMIS identified for donation to the Government of the Sudan, free of charge, assets with an inventory value of $6,276,200 (corresponding residual value: $2,114,800), representing 2.1 per cent of the total inventory value of the Mission's assets, amounting to $293,013,900.

8. A summary of assets identified for donation to the Government of the Sudan is shown in table 1.

Table 1
Summary of assets identified for donation to the Government of the Sudan
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Inventory value	*Residual value as at 31 July 2013*
Accommodation equipment	81.1	21.7
Generators	265.0	155.0
Miscellaneous equipment	396.0	123.8
Petrol tank plus metering equipment	63.5	19.2
Prefabricated buildings	2 833.1	1 181.3
Refrigeration equipment	29.8	7.8
Vehicular equipment	2 538.5	588.0
Water and septic tanks	69.2	18.0
Total	**6 276.2**	**2 114.8**

III. Donation of assets to the Joint Integrated Units

9. In the context of its administrative liquidation, UNMIS identified for donation to the Joint Integrated Units, free of charge, assets with an inventory value of $47,400 (corresponding residual value: $25,600), representing 0.02 per cent of the total inventory value of the Mission's assets, amounting to $293,013,900.

10. A summary of assets identified for donation to the Joint Integrated Units is shown in table 2.

Table 2
Summary of assets identified for donation to the Joint Integrated Units
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Inventory value	*Residual value as at 31 July 2013*
Miscellaneous equipment	47.4	25.6
Total	**47.4**	**25.6**

IV. Classification and disposition of the assets of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

11. The process of liquidating the assets of UNMIS was guided by the following principles and policies contained in financial regulation 5.14:

(a) Equipment in good condition that conforms to established standardization or is considered compatible with existing equipment will be redeployed to other peacekeeping operations or will be placed in reserve to form start-up kits for use by future missions;

(b) Equipment not required for current or future peacekeeping operations may be redeployed to other United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions, provided that there is a demonstrated need for the equipment;

(c) Equipment not required for current or future peacekeeping operations or other United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions but which may be useful for the operations of other United Nations agencies, international organizations or non-governmental organizations will be sold to such agencies or organizations;

(d) Any equipment or property not required or which it is not feasible to dispose of in accordance with subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above or which is in poor condition will be subject to commercial disposal in accordance with the procedures applicable to other United Nations equipment or property;

(e) Any assets which have been installed in a country and which, if dismantled, would set back the rehabilitation of that country shall be provided to the duly recognized Government of that country in return for compensation in a form to be agreed by the Organization and the Government. This refers in particular to airfield installations and equipment, buildings, bridges and mine-clearing equipment. Where such assets cannot be disposed of in this manner or otherwise, they will be contributed free of charge to the Government of the country concerned. Such contributions require the prior approval of the General Assembly.

12. The assets of UNMIS, with a total inventory value of $293,013,900 as at 31 July 2013, have been grouped into 17 categories: accommodation equipment, communications equipment, data-processing equipment, generators, field defence equipment, medical equipment, mine-clearing equipment, miscellaneous equipment, observation equipment, office equipment, petrol tank plus metering equipment, prefabricated buildings, refrigeration equipment, security equipment, vehicular equipment, water and septic tanks, and water purification equipment.

13. In accordance with the principles and policies recalled in paragraph 11 above, the assets of UNMIS have been placed into three groups (see table 3).

Table 3
Summary of the final disposition of assets of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Inventory value	*Percentage*
Group I: transferred to other missions or the Logistics Base for temporary storage	242 978.3	82.9
Group II: disposed of in the mission area		
Sold	2 272.4	0.8
Donation to the Government of the Sudan	6 276.2	2.1
Donation to the Joint Integrated Units	47.4	0.0[a]

	Inventory value	*Percentage*
Group III: written off/lost		
Written off	38 416.7	13.1
Lost or stolen	3 022.8	1.0
Total	**293 013.9**	**100.0**

[a] Rounded.

14. Group I includes assets identified as meeting the requirements of peacekeeping operations or United Nations activities funded from assessed contributions. The items in this group, with an inventory value of $242,978,300 (82.9 per cent of total asset value), have been transferred to other United Nations missions and the Logistics Base to be stored temporarily for future use.

15. Group II includes assets disposed of locally with an inventory value of $8,596,000, representing 3.0 per cent of the total inventory value of UNMIS assets. It consists of assets identified for donation to the Government of the Sudan and the Joint Integrated Units with an inventory value of $6,323,600 and a corresponding residual value of $2,140,400. Assets with an inventory value of $2,272,400 and a corresponding residual value of $603,600 were sold to United Nations agencies and to private companies and individuals on the basis of competitive bidding. The amount of $559,200, representing the proceeds of the sales, was credited as miscellaneous income to the UNMIS special account (see table 4).

Table 4
Sale of assets of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Inventory value	*Residual value*	*Sale value*
Commercial disposal	1 311.9	322.2	559.2
Sold to United Nations agencies	960.5	281.4	–
Total	**2 272.4**	**603.6**	**559.2**

16. The inventory value of assets in group III totals $41,439,500, representing 14.1 per cent of the total asset inventory value and a corresponding residual value of $13,283,800. Those assets have been written off as a result of accidents, damage caused by natural elements, obsolescence, normal wear and tear and uneconomical prospects for repair and loss (see table 5).

Table 5
Written-off property reported by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Inventory value	*Residual value*
Accident, damage and faulty equipment	7 937.4	3 203.3
Lost or stolen equipment	3 022.8	1 039.4
Normal wear and tear and regular life-cycle activity	23 250.9	6 640.5
Obsolescence	5 515.5	1 652.7
Uneconomical to repair	1 712.9	747.9
Total	**41 439.5**	**13 283.8**

V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

17. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session in connection with the financing of UNMIS are:**

(a) **To approve the donation of assets with an inventory value of $6,276,200 and corresponding residual value of $2,114,800 to the Government of the Sudan on a free-of-charge basis;**

(b) **To approve the donation of assets with an inventory value of $47,400 and a corresponding residual value of $25,600 to the Joint Integrated Units on a free-of-charge basis;**

(c) **To take note of the present report.**

United Nations A/68/710

General Assembly

Distr.: General
29 January 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 11
Sport for peace and development: building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal

Solemn appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on 29 January 2014 in connection with the observance of the Olympic Truce

The President of the General Assembly has the honour to make the following solemn appeal in connection with the observance of the Olympic Truce:

"The ancient Greek tradition of the *ekecheira*, or 'Olympic Truce', born in the eighth century B.C., serves as a hallowed principle of the Olympic Games. In 1992, the International Olympic Committee renewed this tradition by calling upon all nations to observe the Truce.

"Through its resolution 48/11 of 25 October 1993, the General Assembly urged Member States to observe the Olympic Truce from the seventh day before the opening to the seventh day following the closing of each Olympic Games. This appeal was renewed in the Millennium Declaration.

"In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, our leaders emphasized that 'sport can foster peace and development' and encouraged the General Assembly to foster a dialogue and agreed proposals for a plan of action on sport and development.

"On 3 November 2005, the General Assembly held a plenary debate on the agenda item entitled 'Sport for peace and development' and also adopted, with universal support, resolution 60/8, entitled 'Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal', deciding to consider this item every two years in advance of each Summer and Winter Olympic Games.

"To this end, on 6 November 2013, the General Assembly adopted resolution 68/9. In that resolution, the Assembly urged Member States to observe the Olympic Truce individually and collectively, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, during the period from the seventh day before the start of the XXII Olympic Winter Games, on 7 February 2014, until the seventh day following the end of the XI Paralympic Winter Games, on 16 March 2014.

14-20984 (E) 240114

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"The Olympic movement aspires to contribute to a peaceful future for all humankind through the educational value of sport, in particular youth. The Games will bring together athletes from all parts of the world in the greatest of international sports events as a means to promote peace, mutual understanding and goodwill among nations and peoples — goals that are also part of the founding values of the United Nations.

"As an expression of these common objectives, the International Olympic Committee has decided to fly the United Nations flag at Olympic Park. The United Nations system and the International Olympic Committee have strengthened their mutual cooperation and support through joint endeavours in such fields as human development, poverty alleviation, humanitarian assistance, health promotion, HIV and AIDS prevention, child and youth education, gender equality, peacebuilding and sustainable development.

"I welcome the leadership of Olympic and Paralympic athletes in promoting peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic ideal, and the commitment made by various States Members of the United Nations to developing national and international programmes that promote peace and conflict resolution and the Olympic and Paralympic values through sport and through culture, education and sustainable development.

"As President of the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session, I solemnly appeal to all Member States to demonstrate their commitment to the Olympic Truce for the 2014 Sochi Olympic and Paralympic Games, and to undertake concrete actions at the local, national, regional and world levels to promote and strengthen a culture of peace and harmony based on the spirit of the Truce. Referring to the original tradition of the Olympic Truce practised in ancient times, as described in resolution 68/9, I also call upon all warring parties of current armed conflicts around the world to boldly agree to true mutual ceasefires for the duration of the Olympic Truce, thus providing an opportunity to settle disputes peacefully."